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IN!RODUCTION 
The Ib1Sso-Japanese War was brought to a close by the Portsmouth 
Oonference. The idea of a conference -s initiated by the two belligerents 
themselves and by President Roosevelt who offered mediation. The underlying 
causes in their desire for peace may never be brought to the foreground; h0w-
ever, the study of the events leading to the conference, and the progress and 
results of the conference bring out pertinent factors whioh may point out h1d-
den causes for seeldng peace. By pointing out public thought as printed in 
the United States journals of opinion and llEftIISPapers, an attempt has been 
made to show the influence, if arr::f, that public opinion may have had upon the 
decision of those figuring in the peace plans. If public thought had no 
influence in this regard this part of the survey may serve as an index of 
public thought at that period. 
fbis study, then, sets out to find the trend in public thought prior 
to the peace negotiations, during the Portsmouth Oonference and after peace 
arrangements had been made. The study also attempts to compare the opinion of 
the American people at one phase of the developments with evidences of public 
thought at other stages of the negotiations and an attempt has been made to 
point out cond! tiona which may haTe caused the American people to shift in 
sentiment from one of indifference to a definite s,mpa.thy toward Japan and 
ii 
later to an almost hostile attitude toward the Japanese people as is pointed. 
.., 
out as the story of public opinion regarding the Portsmouth Conference un-
folds .. 
iii 
... 
BACKGROUND OF THE PORTSMOUTH COmr~E 
During the latter part of the nineteen.th century the relations 
be1m'een the United states and Japan had been friendly. Not only were there 
no serious differences in governmental affairs in that period, but the 
people of both countries were kindly disposed to eaoh other. The people at 
both Japan and the United states had had few ocoasions to demonstrate their 
good 1'lill toward each other; therefore their regard for eaoh other developed 
into a lukewarm feeling whioh was taken for granted. Payson J. Treat viewed 
this mutual sentiment in the following way: tf ••• it may be said that the 
American people so far as they are informed ooncerning Far Eastern affairs, 
1 
were interested in and well disposed to Ja.pan." Interest in the Far East, 
therefore, did not originate with President Theodore Roosevelt's aotivities 
in the war between the Russians and the Japanese; interest in the Far East 
had begun before the turn of the oentury whioh saw the United States emerge 
as a world power. 
The development of the United states as a world power gave impetus 
to new and varied interests in the Far East. The possession of the Hawaiian 
1 Payson J. Treat, tfbn and the United States, 1853-1921 
(Stanford, Ca.lifornia: Stanto niversrEY Fress, me" p. 187 
1 
2 
and Ph111ppine...Islands as well as the growth of population and commerce on 
t..~ Pacific Coast, trade in the Far East and the building of the Panama 
Canal. were, in the eyes of most historians, factors which caused the United 
states to look toward Asia.2 
Byl9Q; I the eyes of the American people were focused on Asia for 
a number of reasons. In looking toward Asia, European polities also came 
into view because there exists an interdependence between tar eastern 
policies and developments in Europe.3 
'!'he Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 did not stand as an isolated 
policy and may not be tairly judged without considering the events in 
Europe, the Near East and other parts ot the Far F.a.st as wel1.4 !fa.ny coun-
tries were indirectly involved in the war. Korea and Manchuria played a 
large part in the contlict but the more remote pawns in the contest-
Hawaii and the Philippines caused the American nation and lfr. Roosevelt to 
become even more concerned about the war's outcome.. Tyler Dennett points 
out this tact when he tells Us that it is a false assumption to think that 
the Far F..astern conflict was merely a contest tor Korea. He wrote: 
• 
Korea was one ot the pawns I though not so important 
a one as Manchuria .... Morocco ••• was another,. and 
perhaps we ahall conclude that the desire of the 
American government to protect her possessions in 
4 ..... 
2 Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the RUSSo-Ja~ese War (Garden 
City, New York: Doubleday Page arid compi'ny. 19~~)" p. -
3 Ibid. 
-
4 Ibid. 
-
Hawa;i.i and the ~hilippines was also a. factor in 
the settlement.;J 
Formerly the desire to check European aggression in China. had 
resulted in the formation of the Open D,::,or. Economic and mili:ta.ry 
penetration in this area continued to advance to the point that a settle-
ment had to be made. 'lhe question that arose from the conflict between the 
Russian and the Japanese governments was: who will be the undisputed ruler 
of the Pacific-Russia or Japan? '!'his change of events affected .American 
economic interests directly, and was a possible threat to political and 
social developments in the future", 
The average American wa.s unaware of the importance of Far Eastern 
events. Mr. Dulles points out reasons why Americans as a wholA were un-
interested in these matters at the time. He said: 
••• while the country was still a little intoxicated 
by its proud status as a new world power and the 
energetic Mr. Roosevelt was not only prepared but 
eager to dabble in international polities in other 
parts of' the world, the man on the street found 
interests near at home more important. 6 
The A.merican people. s attitude toward Japan, then, was one of 
friendly indiff'ere.."lCe; but because the public objected to Russian 
aggression in Manchuria, talk of the "Muscovite Perlln began to spread 
. -
5 Ibid. 
-
6 Foster Rhea Dulles, FortZ Years of American Japanese Relations 
(New York: D. Appleton Century Company, !~7r; p. 5~ 
4 
even in the eo~ersation of the man on the street.? 
In 1903 President Roosevelt had become alarmed because of the 
Russian advance into Manchuria. Because he feared this action he wrote 
Secretary of state John Hay concerning Russia. In this note Mr. Roosevelt 
stated that he would go to any extreme if Russia oontinued her policy in 
Ma.nchuria.8 1Ia.ny thought, havrever, t~t :Mr. Roosevelt had gone a little 
too far in his statement. Hr. Dulles said that people would not have 
backed Mr. Roosevelt in this action. FIe pointed out that the public was 
only mi~ aroused, and although the press featured such articles as 
"Is Russia to Establish a Universal :&!pire?". "Russiata Conquest of AB1a") 
and dShall Russia Dominate the Warld?", no 'Vital interest of theirs was at 
stalce in lIanelnlrla. They knew too little about Manchuria and it was too 
far away.9 Host of the material written in this period shows that the 
American public favored Japan, however, there is no evidence at the early 
stages of the negotiations that the public was aroused toward Russia. The 
sentiment toward Japan had a moral basis: the American public disliked 
Russia's lack of good faith in not keeping her word in evacuating ManehuriatD 
7 Ibid. 
-
8 Foster Rhea Dulles, The Road to Tehera.n (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University PreiS'; I9L1i);-p':'8o 
9 Ibid. 
-
5 
Forei<gn investors had frequently warned the State Department o.f 
the dangerous situation in Manchuria. Journallsts, foreign investors and 
govermnental officials had for a long time been aware that po.ssible commer-
cial and politioal changes might be the result of Russiats penetration in 
Manchuria. 11 
Oorrespondence continued between Mr. Roosevelt and Secretary' at 
. 
State Hay concerning the Russian advance into Ohina. The President even 
went so far as tD say that the Russian diplomats deceived the United States 
wi th "brazen and contemptuous e:f'f'ron'teryf' wh:1le at the same time they 
attempted to organize Ohine. against our interests.12 America and European 
powers complained of Russiats penetration into China. In answer to these 
complaints Oount Ouaint, the Russian Ambassador in Washington, pointed out 
that China was al.ready being dismembered by ma..nT countries, and because of 
these prevailing circumstances J Russia would never withdraw from Uanchuria. lJ 
JIr. Roosevelt's policy in the Far East at this time was ltenthusi:-
astically endorsed by the people.·14 No transition was necessary when 
Secretary of state Hay was sent abroad in March for his bealth. Mr. Roosevelt 
11 Dulles, Road to. Teheran, p. 86-87 
--
12 Ibid. 
-
13 Ibid. 
-
14 Ibid. 
-
6 
had for some t:tme nv1rtua.lly been his own secretary of state. "lS Regarding 
Mr. Roosevelt's dual position as president and secretary of state, several 
comments vrore madel A Japanese minister said, "'l'he president is certa.:f.nl.y 
introdUCing a new school of diplomacy. n16 Wh1 tnay Griswold quoted another 
statement which said that the PreSident laid himself open to knocks which 
should have been taken by the Seoret&r7of State.17 "Few presidents, said 
. 
Mr. Griswold, "have exerted such an arbi tNry control of foreign poliey- as 
Theodore Roosevelt. nlS The President shared oonfidences chieflywith three 
men: Sir Cecil Spring-R1oe, Baron Speck Van Sternbury, and Jusserand.19 
Mr. Roosevelt's favor was sought for m&ny' reasons. The Japanese 
government told President Roosevelt of its readiness for his good offices.20 
German;,v also sought Roosevelt's favor. German,r's policy had been to push 
Russia along in Manchur1a.21 !his design ot the Ka1ser was to help the Ozar 
win Manchuria and to share with him the partitioning ot North Ohina in return 
for Russian concessions in middle Europe and :north east to the Berlin to 
• 
-
15 Ibid. 
-
16 Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern pr~ of the United States 
(New York: Haroourt Brace and OonIPanY,; 1938, p. - --
17 Ibid. 
-
18 Ibid. 
-
19 Ibid. 
-
20 Samuel Flagg BemiS, Diplomatio H:f.s~ of the United States 
(New York. Henry Holt, 1930), p. Ji~ --
21 Griswold, p. 94 
7 
Bagdad poliey a!!d the Drang.!!!Sh Osten.22 The Ka1ser knew that this scheme 
would be detected if he openly became involved in this diplomatic intrigue; 
tbere£ore he appealed to Mr. Roosevelt through the German M'inister, Sternburg, 
to sunmone the belligerents to observe the neutrality of China outside the 
sphere of military operations-that is outside of Manchuria. and North Ohina.23 
Samuel Bemis also stated that the Kaiser was planning an alliance 
. 
with RUSsia, so he wanted to win Rooseveltts support for that cause.24 
Roosevelt had let Japan know that he thought that they deserved to have 
Korea and Secretary of state Hayls note on the "open door" had ignored 
Koroo.2S Mr. Roosevelt asked one condition for his services: that Japan 
pledge herself to the doctrine of "open doortt in Manchuria. Great Britian 
stayed clear of these negotiations. 26 
Prior to the actual offer of good office to the two belligerents, 
Mr. Roosevelt had on lIarch 9, written to Sir George Tevelyan saying that he 
had privately and unofficially advised Russia to sue for peace.27 This 
action and other diplomatic maneuvering preceeded President Rooseveltts of-
ficial peace proposal. Mention of peace also had been made to King Edward 
4" • 
22 Ibid. 
-
23 Ibid. 
-
24 Bemis, p. 491 
25 Ibid. 
-
26 Ibid. 
-
27 Joseph Bucklin, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920)" p. ~'f>..j-m --
8 
of England.28 aoth the Russian Ambassador, Oount Ca.ssini, and the Japanese 
Minister Koretiyo 'l'akahira had vis:1 ted Washington, making peace overtures; 29 
hOwever, peaoe negotiations did not seem hopei"ul because neither of the 
....arr1ng countries lm.nted to appear to be the first to accept peaoe measures)O 
Mr. Roosevelt gave a summary of this situation in his autobiogra.ph1'.3l In 
his chapter entitled "The Peace ot Righteousness" .. Mr. Roosevelt wrote: 
During the early part of the year 1905 the strain on 
the civilized world caused by' the Russo-Japanese War 
became serious.. The losses of life and of treasure 
were trightful from all sources of information at 
home. I grew most strongly to believe that a further 
continuation of the struggle would be a very bad ~2 
thing for Japan, and an even worse thing for Russia. ~ 
Mr. Roosevelt in his next statement minimized the effects of 
Japanese victories in the PacifiC, by assuming that Russian victory would 
have a d.amag:tng atfect on the future. Be continued saying" ..... Japan might 
have met defeat. and defeat to her would have spelt overwbel.ming disaster ••• "3 
The next statement tells ot Mr. Roosevelt's peace offer: ttl believed, there-
fore, that the time had come when it was greatly to the interest of both 
combatants to have peace .... 834 
When Mr. Roosevelt thought it possible to get both to agree to 
28 Ibid. 
-
29 Ibid., p. 377 
-
)0 Ibid. 
-
31 Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt (New York: Oharles 
Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 540 
32 Ibid. 
-33 Ibid. 
-34 Ibid. 
9 
peace, he sent identical notes to the two powers proposing that they meet 
through their representatives to see whether peace could. be made. Mr. 
Roosevelt offered to act as an 1ntermedisr.r in bringing about this meeting)$ 
An article in the .!!! !2!!! .;;;;,;Tim;;;,;.;;;;;;eB ... from St. Petersburg denied attempts to 
secure peace. !his statement said: "From all information obtainable it is 
regarded as certain that aotual negotiations for peaoe between the belli.g-
. 
erents are not yet underw&yJ36 from Paris oame a. denial that Minister 
De Lacasse' and Dr. Montono, the Japanese minister, were taking an aotive 
part in the negotiations for peace.;37 and Jusserand who had visited the 
president in Washington said, "I do not think the gO"l'ertml.ent of the Un! ted 
States is oonsidering as yet any offensive move toward intervention.",3B 
Efforts between Russia and Japan to settle differences peacef'ully 
had never ceased from the outbreak of hostilities. Four different ldnds of 
mediation had been offered. One sought to br1ng about peaoe through an in-
ternational conference, England and France &8 allies of the belligerents 
offered mediation; the Um. ted States because of ita neutral status was a 
possible souroe from whioh :rna.ny thought mediation might stem; the possibility 
3$ Ibid., p. $4l 
-
,38 Ibid. 
-
10 
that negotiatiou between the two belligerents themselves might bring peaoe 
was also a source of hope to the non-military factors in each government.39 
"1 made nry first move in the negotiation on their requesttt , Jfr. 
Roosevelt wrote Senator Oabot Ledge. ho The Japanese in their appeal tor 
peace wanted the United States to aot as a ttneutral"" they wanted to conduct 
negotiations directly with Russia.h1 Of his action, Mr. Roosevelt said in 
hie autobiography', "1 first satisfied myself that each side wished me to 
act, but that naturally and properly each side was exceedingly anxious that 
the other should not believe that the aotion was taken on its own im. tia-
tive.nh2 It was at this time that the president sent identical notes to 
both Russia and Japan proposing that they meet through their representat1 ves 
to see whether peace could be brought about by such a meeting. 
'!'he Russo-Japanese War had begun February 1904. !he sympathetic 
attitude toward Japan was strengthened by the general beliet that Japan had 
entered the 'War after suttering much humiliation by Russia.43 Secretary' 
Root justitied the Japanese cause in comnencing the war and even praised the 
Nipponese for their "frankness" and "meticulousness" in minimizing the cause 
ot the controversy. Lh 
• 
39 Dennett, p. 170 
40 Joseph E. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Times (New York: 
Oharles Scribnerts Sons, 1920), p. j8! - -
U Roosevelt, p. S40 
42 Ibid. 
-
43 .!!!!2!':!! Daily 'l'imes .. 
1..._ 4h Arthur Judson Brown, !he Master,x ot the Far East, <New York. 
Cu,",,,·les Scr1bner f s SOl'l8, 1919), p. m:o - - --
II 
Although Russia was much larger and supposedly possessed a more 
power£u.l military machine, she had lost much in the struggle with the Japan-
ese. It was improbable that she would be mOl'"€ able to defend Eastern Siberia 
and Northern !lanchuria than she bad been able to defend. Southern Manchuria 
and Korea.~ Japan, too, suffered tremendous losses f!oom the lack of proper 
resources and the drain on her men.46 Further continuation of the struggle, 
. 
thought Mr. Roosevelt, would be a very bad thing for Japan and even worse 
for Russia.47 
In the spring and summer of 1905, the Japanese mill ta.ry and naval 
leaders left their posts for Tokyo to insist that the Cabinet malea peace. 48 
Russia IS fleet had been annihilated, her al'll\Y had been disastrously defeated, 
her railway connections were entirely inadequate; moreover, she was oonfron-
ted with finanoial and political distress.49 Although the war map was in 
Japants favor, her financial status like Russia's was poor and. they had 
paid dearly for each advance. Russia used French loans and Japan received 
loans from both Great Britian50 and the United. states.)l In a New York 
--
Times financial section, a report praised Japan t s t:1.nancial ai tuation. It , 
.11 
h5 Theodore Roosevelt (revlsed 00..), p. 583 
46 Ibid. 
-
47 Ibid. 
-48 Griswold, p. 118 
49 Brown, p. 178-180 
SO The President of the Kuhn Loeb Company was deoorated after the 
War by the King for his cooperation with the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Bishop, 
p. 381 
$1 Jewish bankers used war loans to Japan as a means of retaliation 
tor Russiafs barbaric anti-semitism. Griswold, p. 1.05' 
12 
also revealed tke fact that public opinion played an important part in the 
stock markets b.1 causing speculators to strive more desperately to speculate 
which country would be victorious. A one hundred and fifty million dollar 
($1.50,000,000) Japanese loan was floated in New York. The report stated 
that French buyers were "hedging" to gain from Japan possible losses from 
Russia. (The article itself stated that this was not a universal belief.)>2 
Considerable hesitation ensued between the writing of the peace 
notes and the acceptance by the belligerents. The Japanese people thought 
the time was too early for peace and that the very least to expeot for 
indemnity from Russia would be 1,.500,000,000 yen • .53 There was also the 
general feeling in Japan that unless thoroughly satisfaotory terms were 
reached, there would be no peaoe. They thought that. they should first 
capture Harbin and Vla.d1V08took. Other Japanese demands involved Saghal1en. 
They thought Japan should have Saghalien because therein laid the chief 
source of fear in insuring supremacy of the Sea of Japan .. S4 Sato regarding 
this said that it merely represented edt torial opinions and would do no harm .. 
• I _ .... 
52 New York Times, April 2, 190.5 
--
53 Vasujior Iskikawa editor ot the Hooi Shimbun, a Tokyo news-
paper as reported in Bew York Tribune. Some wIifi.id Indemnity of .5 billion 
yen £rom Russia. - - . 
.54 New York Tribune" August 1" 1905. 
--
He also said, "iome people in Japan might think it is too early to end the 
war, but the general opinion favors cessation of 108ses. 1155 The Russian 
ease was complicated further by; conflicting messages between Mr. Ueyer and 
count Cassin!; the public's idea of probable peace terms and concessions, 
and domestic troubles. 
The notes to the Czar and the Mikado offered the friendly services 
of the United States in arranging the time and place of the meeting. 
Japan accepted the offer of the President June 10, the Russians 
sent word of their acceptance two dqs later, June 12, 1905.56 conflict 
arose regarding the meeting place. Suggestions tor possible places were: 
Paris, the Hague, and Washington. Washington was chosen tor the meeting 
place, but the conference waa arranged at Portsmouth, New Hampshire because 
of inclimate weather in Washington. Further delay was caused by the suspicion 
of the Japanese that Russia was not sending its top men; someone who could 
actually carry on negotiations sf.tOuld an agreement be reached. At first 
President Roosevelt had tried to get the names of the plenipotentiaries 
and keep ita secret. It was soon disclosed that the Japanese had appointed 
Baron Komura and Mr. 1C0retiyo Takahira; the Russians had appointed Count 
Witte and Baron Rosen. 57 
-.-------
55 Ibid. 
-
56 Ward and others, Cambri~e Modern History. XII (New York: 
The 'Macmillan Company, 1910), p. 600 
57 Brown, p. 182 
The nwn selected were impressive figures and met with the public's 
approval. Mr. Takahira was the acting minister in the United States. He 
had a thorough knowledge of the details. 58 Baron lomura was a Harvard man 
of much diplomatic experience, having previously been minister to Korea, 
China, and Russia. 59 Baron Rosen, the new minister to the United States 
succeeding Count Cassini was well known in the United States having pre-
viously spent eight years as Secretary of the Russian Embassy and four years 
60 Counsel General in New York. Al though disliked by the Grand Ducal party in 
Russia, llr. Witte was generally liked elsewhere and had been known as an 
exponent of peace from his actions in the war of his country and Japan and 
outward statements by the former tinance minister regarding his desire for 
peace. 
The American public was eager to begin festivities the moment the 
representatives arrived. They found Sergyi.e Witte a colorful figure. He 
was given credit tor "planting .. eds of undying friendship with Russia. tt6J. 
The Japanese were the more reserved representatives, the general 
concept concerning Japanese representatives seemed to be more remote yet not 
5& William Elliot Griffis, The Japanese Nation in Evolution, 
(London: George Harrap and CO!'pany, 19m, p. 377-379 -
59 Brown, p. 184 
60 Ibid. 
-
61 J. Hapgood, Ambassador ~..! Inttich Witt.e Russia's Van ot 
the Hour, Craftsmen, IX (November l~o",p-:-l57 . - -
--
62 
unf'r1endly to Ute .American public. 
15 
Thus the scene for the Portsmouth Conference was set. Russia and 
Japan had engaged in hostilities which upset and endangered the oommercial 
and political balanoe of the world.63 Eaoh oountry wanted peaoe, but neither 
wanted to take the initia.tive in Bueing for peace since they thought an 
action of this kind would a.dmit defeat.64 It was generally believed that 
6 . U 
Japan had gained the mOB t ground J 5 yet she had suffered tremendously. 
lir. Roosevelt offered to set up a suitable place where the two could negotiate 
peace. This otfer was accepted by both countries and their "impressivelf 
representatives came to the United States. 
At this time it .,. be pointed out that the public was skeptical 
concerning the success of the conference. An example of a public s ta tamen t 
regarding the possible failure of the conference is Mr. Stra.eheyts statement, 
The pea.ce conference is about to meet but chances are 
unfa.vorable for peace. The Russians who were entirely 
unable tg7make war seem now entirely unable to make 
peace ••• 
Vr. Roo.evel t shared the skepticism in the efree ti veness of the 
conference in a letter to Senator KllUte Nelson of Uinnesota. when he wrote: 
62 W. D. Hmmlls, The Peacemakers at Portsmouth, Harperts Weekly 
XLIX (August 26, 1244-1904). - -
63 Dennett, p. 6 
64 Roosevelt, p. 540 
65 ~. 
66 Ibid. 
-
67 Bishop, p. 401 
I have not an idea whether I can or can not get peace ••• 
I have done m:I best I have led t.he horse to water, but 
heaven only knows whether they will ~gnk or start 
kicking one another under the trough. 
---... . ... _-
68 Ibid., p. 398 
-
16 
CHAPTER II 
THE PROCEEDINGS OF '!'HE PORTSMOUTH CONF'E.i'tBNCE 
The American press was tilled with descriptions of the plenipoten-
taries, and outward celebrations were 'held in honor of the delegates. The 
actual meetings remained secret. No attempt has been made to recapture every 
detail of the demonstrations in honor of the Portsmouth Conference, only that 
which seems to reflect public thought printed in the press has been stated 
here. Some detail has been given to characterize the delegates as it is the 
belief of m~ writers that the personalities of the delegates themselves did 
much to sway public thought. 
The most colorful figure in the negotiations was Sergius Witte. He 
was chosen to succeed Murants!f. In 1903 Witte was forced to resign as 
Minister of Finance. He had realized before the war that the Itaggressive 
policy of Viceroy Alexieff and M. Bezobrazoff in the Tuu Timber company 
would eventual~ drive Japan to war."l H1s relations with Japan had been 
friendly. He had received an invitation trom Marguis Ito to visit their 
country in 1903. From the time Ur. Witte first set foot on .American shores 
until he left, he was followed by a crowd. He seBl1ed to realize that his 
task was to .... in the American people and he sensed that this could be done by 
17 
making friends with the press and the crowds. On his arrival, still aboard 
the Kaiser Wilhelm dar Grosse, he thanked the American newspapers for their 
hospitality on his first visit. He said that it touohed him greatly to 
realize the vas t power of the United states t press. 2 Crowds had awai ted trom 
2.00 a.m. to meet the Russian "man of desttny.u3 Never betore has it been 
in one man' s power to ask his sovereign such changes as those Which Wi tte has 
demanded and obtained trom Nioholas I~, oommented a wri tar in Outloo~. 4 
A ~ical report in an American newspaper regarding the arrival of 
the delega tea read: 
'l'he peace squardron will arrive at Oyster Bay about noon 
and anchor. Its arrival will be heralded by the firing 
of an ambassadorial salute of 19 guns for each mission 
from the Galveston, Mayflower and Dolph1n which will be 
waiti.ng to convey the p1enipotentaries to the Portsmouth 
Conference. The President will arrive at about one 
o'clock and receive the presidential salute of 21 guns 
from all ships in the harbor. The presidential flag 
will be hoisted on the lfIqf'loWer. The Japanese envoys 
will cooe abroad and be presented by the ac ting Secretary 
of State Piel'ce. One-halt hour later the Russian envoys ••• 5 
It was generally that the conduct ot aftairs was ot the highest 
order. The NeW' York 'Iribune affirmed this belief when it wrote that if there 
........- ____ n 
were no definite peace setUement, it would not be the fault ot the president~ 
...... II. It 
2 Ibid. 
-
3 Ibid. 
4 De Martens, "World Significance of the Treaty of Portsmouth," 
Ou tlo<?~ LXXXI (November 11, 190,), 603. 
5 New lor¥; 1ribune, A.ugust 4, 1905. 
-----
6 ~., August 6, 1905. 
19 
This newspaper also said, "not a single incident marred the perfect smooth-
ness of the arrangements and their exeeution. n7 
Another report said that the plenipotentiaries seemed, by a single 
handshake, to be imbued with the Presidentts heartiness. (Yet, it added, 
their faces belied their 88\Y actions). 8 All women were barred from the con-
ference. There was to be no charm and graoiousness to soothe irritations. 
Ever,y possible means was used to seclude the delegates from interferenoe 
and oontacts with the outside world. 
The first meeting of the envoys took place on August 5, 1905 on 
board the presidential yatoh, Mayflower, off Oyster Bay J Long Island. The 
President, not wishing to show favoritism assumed an informal attitude whioh 
was considered typical Amerioanism. 
In a toast near the beginnirlg of their meeting, Hr. Roosevelt said: 
GenUemen I propose a tout to which there 'Will be no 
answer and to which I ask you only to drink in silenoe. 
I drink to the wlrare and prosperi ty and the sovereigns 
and the people of two great nations 'Whose representatives 
have met one another on this ship. It is J1J3' earnest hope 
and prayer in the interest of not only those two powers, 
but of all civilized mankind, that a just and lasting 
peace may speedily be ooncluded between them. 9 
This statement along with other jestures bears out Bishop's 
quotation about the President. "His conduot during the whole time that the 
flU 
7 ~. 
8 Ibid. 
-
9 Joseph Bucklin Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and his Times 
(new York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 192b), p. 405 --
20 
peace negotiatiena lasted has been a marvel of tact ••• HIO 
The general opinion was that Japan and Russia would fail to agree 
on peace terms. A message informing all to whom it might concern was 
reoeived from Russia stating that Russiats envoy knew of no acceptable basis 
nor of a:ny lines approved by both parties upon which a oommon platform might 
. 11 
be oonstruoted. Mr. Witte said that he was ooming solely to learn the 
. 
nature ot the proposals which the Japanese were prepared to make.12 Rumors 
were rampant concerning Mr. Witte's inability to speak tor the Emperor, how-
ever Hr. Witte insisted that he was empowered to arrange peace within 1. . ·wenty-
four hours it the Japanese terms were satisfactory. Although the opinion of 
most writers was that Japan and Russia would fail to agree on peace terms, 
it was hoped that the conference would not be a fiasoo. 
Baron Xomura submitted in writing twelve Japanese demands August 
19, 1905 at the second session ot the conference. lJ 
The twelve demands as reported by Hr. Hershey werel 
1. The recognition by Russia ot Japants paramount 
interests in lorea. 
2. An engagement on the part ot Russia to completely 
evacuate Manchuria and to relinquish all territorial 
advantages in that region whioh tended to impair 
Chinese sovereignty or were inconsistent with 
prinoiples ot equal opportunity. 
10 Ibid., p. 421 from Outlook, January 1920. 
-
11 New york Times, July 18, 1905. 
------
12 Ibid. 
-
13 Amos s. Hershey, Intemational Law and Diplomaol ot the Russo-
i.apanese !!!: (New York: The Maomulan company-;-l915O), p. 35i'5. - - • 
3. An tmgagement on the part of Japan to restore to China. 
all those portions of Manchuria which she occupied" 
with the: exclusion of the regions affected by the lease 
ot the Lia-tung pennineula. 
21 
4. A mutual engagement on the part of Japan and Russia. 
not to obstruct al\'r general measures (i.e. common to all 
countries) which China my take for the development of 
the commerce and industries of Manchuria. 
5. Cession ot Skahal1n to Japan. 
6. The transfer to Japan of the Russian leases of the Lia-
tung pennisula, including Port Arthur and Talien (~). 
7. The transfer to Japan of the Russian portions of the 
South Manchurian railroads (together with its branches) 
conneoting Harbin with Port Arthur and of all coal mines 
appertaining thereto. 
8. The retention by Russia of the main lines or latitudinal 
section of the central eastern or trans-Manehurian rail-
road; on condition that it be emplo,yed exclusively for 
commercial and industrial purposes. 
9.. The demand for a war indemnity or rather reimbursement 
for the cost of the war. (The amount was not stated but 
the cost of the war was variously estimated at from 
$500,000,000 to $1,000,000,000. 
10. The surrender to Japan of all Russian warships interned 
in neutral pcrts during the Vlar. 
n. The 11m1tation of Russia's naval force in the Far FAst. 
12. The grant of Japanese ellbjects to certain fishing rights 
on the Siberian coaat.14 
Russia's reply to these demands was controlled by her precarious 
economic military a.nd diplomatic position.lS 
Maintaining that she was not a def'ea"t.ed nation, Russia ref'used to 
consider certain of these points.16 Baron Komura. proposed that the articles 
be taken one by one to see whether a point of agreement might be reached.17 
-.. 
14 Ibid. 
-
JS Wh:1 tney Grlswold, 1'he Far F..astern POli~ of the United States 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and e'ompiiiY, 1§38), p. D - - , 
16 E. J. Dillon, "The Story of the Peace Negotiations", Review of 
!eviews, LnXVIII (October 1905), p. It.27 -
17 Hers p. 351 
22 
Russia "Positively rejeoted the following four danands: 
Articles five - the cession of Sakh.al1n, nine - the indemnity, 
ten - the surrender of all Russian warships interned in neutral parts, and 
eleven - llnrl.tation of Russia 1s naval forces. 18 
The Japanese backed down on the last issue since Russia refused to 
consider it at all. The Russian envoys stated that Russia would rather 
. 
continue the war than yield to these conds. tiona .19 
The Japanese delegates had not depended too wholeheartedly upon 
articles ten and eleven, therefore, after an interview between Baron Rosen 
and Mr. Roosevelt at Oyster Bay, the Japanese withdrew their demand of 
articles nine, ten, eleven, and modified article five to have Russia sell the 
northern halt of Sakhalin to Russia in consideration of a sum of money. 20 
In a personal note to the Czar delivered by Ambassador Meyer, Mr. 
Roosevelt urged the Czar to aocept the demands and pointed out the inadvisa-
bili ty of continuing war. 21 
A oonfidential note was then sent to Baron Kaneko22 a Japanese 
.... . ..... 
18 Arthur Judson Brown, The Masteq of the Far East (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919), p. !SO - - --
19 Hershey, p. 3,4. This sum ot money an amount of 600,000,000 
was set by Mr. Roosevelt insists JAr. Dillon. The London Times denied that 
it was set by the President. 
20 Bishop, p. 406 
21 Hershey, p. 354 
22 Baron Kaneko was called by newspaper men the financial and 
unofficial representative of the Japanese government. 
-
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minister residing' in the United states ","i thout portfolio, requesting that he 
ask immediate settlement of his government.2.3 Mr. Roosevelt reminded him that 
evt'!f!'Y' interest of civilization and humanity forbade the continuance of war for 
an indemnity. 24 
The representatives remained rigid: the Japanese representatives 
tenaciously holding to their demands and the Russian delegates stubbornly re-
o 
fusing to accept them. 
On August 23, 190$, the President again appealed to Japan saying' 
Ethically it seems to me that Japan owes a duty to the 
world at this crisis. The civilized world looks to her 
to made peace; the nations believe in her; let her show 
her leadership in matters ethical no less than in matters 
mili ta.ry. This appeal is made to her in the name of all 
that is lofty and noble and in this appeal I hope she 
will not be deaf. 2S 
In answer to the President's appeal to Baron Kaneko, Japan expressed 
her willingness to make concessions in the amount of indemn1 ty asked but re-
:tused to withdraw the demand for reimbursement of a portion ot the cost of 
the war.26 
So grave was the deadlock that followed in the conference that 
Baron Komura. in a ldre to Baron Kaneko said that he considered the last hope 
• 
23 Bishop, p. 406 
24 Ibid. 
-
2; Ibid., p. 407 
-
26 Ibid., p. 409 
-
24 
of peace gone. 27 ... 
President Roosevelt had asked Great Bri tian to try to influence 
Japan28 and Germany to try to influence Russia to accept the peace terms. 29 
Baron lemura was not the only one who had lost hope in the progress 
of the conference, it was the general belief that Roosevelt had failed. 30 But 
on the last session which had been post~oned from August 28 to August 29, 1905~ 
Baron Komura. gave Ms &peror' s consent to withdraw all demands of indemnity 
and to divide Sakhalin between Russia and Japan.31 
To many of Japan's friends, the results seemed at first sight to 
favor Russia, but Japan had secured at Portsmouth all and even more than she 
had demanded from. Russia prior to the outbreak of war.)2 
The world was shocked and the disappointed of the Japanese populace 
showed itself in serious rioting.)) More will be said of the reaction of the 
people in these countries in the final chapter of this paper. 
The actual signing of the treaty on September " 1905 was an anti-
climax to this important conference. After the Signing the mtIllbers of the 
27 Ibid. 
-
28 It was not disclosed until several weeks aftar the Treaty of 
Portsmouth had been signed that on August 12, 190" an Offensive and Defensive 
Alliance had been concluded between Great Bri tian and Japan. 
29 mshop, p. 409 
30 Hershey I p. 3" 
31 Ibid. 
-32 Ibid. 
-
( 33 Ward, A. W. and others, C&mbr1dl5 Modern His!9!2 Volume XII New York: The Macmillan Company, 191(5)" p. . 1 
~ussian mission 1I'ere scheduled to go to Christ Episcopal Church 1n Portsmouth 
IWhere a .!! ~ service was to be held. Before leaving, Baron Komura vin ted 
his alma mater, Harvard University. 
The actual agreements were made in secret but a "publio rehearsal" 
rns held in the presence of the secretaries at which the record was made. In 
this meeting, the Japanese again offered their compromises, met ref'usal, and. 
. 
finally coneeeded to no indemnity and to the division of Sakhalin.34 
The people of the United States cheered President Roosevelt because, 
by his actions, the United States had for the first time become a mediator in 
a foreign conflict. There was skepticism about the final results of this 
foreign policy and also fear that a new way ot life was being ushered in, but 
the average citizen had no further thought than one of pride toward their 
leader. The Japanese too felt that their country' was on the threshold of a 
new era. 'fhey wanted the world to become aware of the fact that they had 
arrived, therefore, they disapproved of the terms of peace which did not im-
mediately elevate Japan to the position she thought she deserved. Tokyo 
reports in American newspapers stated that the public would eventually accept 
the result of the peace conference hcmever disappointing it may have been.3S 
'!'he end of the Conference meant rejoicing and congratulations to 
President Roosevelt in the United States, rioting by the radicals and general 
34 .!!!!2!:!: ... 1'r:t ........... 'bune .........' September S, 1905. 
3S Ibid., September 7. 1905. 
-
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disa.ppointment in--Japan and in Russia the peace terms did nothing to allay the 
existing revolutions. 36 
36 Ibid. 
-
-
... 
OBAP'lER III 
THE Am'tUDE OF THE PEOPLE TOWAIm RU'SSIA AND JAPAN 
During the Ruaso-Japanese struggle the United State. t attitude was 
of benevolent neutral1 ty toward Japan. In the Amerioan press Japaneee 
I'ITLlIr.LIt'1:! were reoorded with a ttll'Vor lItIh10h could hardly bave been less 
.... 811n feel1.ng."l 
'the public as well as President ROO$EfV'el t himself thought that the 
Japanese cause in 1fa.nc:olhur1a was one with that of all ciT.U1zed powers.2 Paul 
I. Re1nch in an article ent! tled "Japan and Asiatic Leadership" expressed a 
1w.»iIL/..foC1W. belief tbat Japan was fighting "our" battle. He said that it is a 
I_mon belief in Germany and France that England and the Un! ted states are 
-.u"u.ug Japan.' In the same publloation a f_ months later this idea ftS 
apressed by Ohester Hol.combe. "It is not merely a battle betw'gen Ruesia and 
• .,UM.- he insisted, "it is rather a conclusive struggle 'between the powers of 
Far East and the ambitious lust and greed of the great powers ot Europe to 
( 1 Foster Rhea Dulles, F~ Years of AlnE!r1cap-J!E!nese l!~t1ons, lew York: D. Appleton-Century Oompa.n;,v;-m1), p .. 10 
2 Ibid., p. 67 
3 Paul S. Reinch, "Japan and Asiatic Leadership,· Worth .American 
....... -.:;;:;.7 Vol. OUXI (Ja.nuary 19Q5l I p. ~7 ' I 
21 
r 
28 
determine onee end for all the right to existence and the status ot (Japan) •• ~ 
Japan was looked upon and admired as a courageous, struggling 
nation with insufficient man power and supplies to achieve her goal.; 
Americans have been known to champion the ftunder-dog. n American opinion 
favored Japan who was apparently fighting to check an imperial Pan-Slavism 
wrote Vr. Reinch in the Political Scieqoe guarterll;.6 An attempt to explain 
this pro-Japanese feeling was made in an editorial in the New York '1':im.e8.7 
-
'.l'his article said that the sympathy extended to Japan in their struggle with 
Russia was in a very high degree a moral issue. The American public disliked 
Russia's want ot good faith in not keeping her word in evacuating Manchuria. 
We approved and admired the frc:.nkness ot Japanese in setting forth the 
objectives tor which they went to war. Objectives which our sense of right 
accepted as justU1ab1e and sufficient. Japan, a nation whose VeFy aistence 
was threatened, was taking measure,. ot selt-defense. Japan's pledge to main-
tain the "open door" was supposedl7 another outward sign that Japan' 8 c&uas 
was one with western interests. 8 
'fhat the Japanese were aware ot sentimental feeling toward the 
td 
4 Chester Holcombe, "Some Results ot the Eastern War" I Atlantic 
Uont!9:Z, XCVI (Jul¥ 190$), p.. 30 
; Raymond L. Buell, "Development ot Anti-Japanese Agit&t1on", 
Political Science ~rterl:l, Vol .. XXXVII (December 1922), p. 614 
6 Paul S. hinch, p. ;7 
7 !!! ~ 'Hmes, May 3, 1905. 
8 Ibid .. 
-
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Un! ted States ant1 also shared tbis sentiment is evident f'rom the two following 
quotations from Japanese sources: "America from the beginning to the end, has 
made no secret ot her sympathy tor our land." 9 Another Japanese publication 
the T!5lo referred to American sympathy toward their cause. It stated: 
America is the home of the open door policy and of the 
maintenance of' the integrity of China, and tor these 
great principles Nippon bas talcen up arms against Russia. 
America has shared ever:! effOrt to open Jl&nehuria to the 
world's commerce band-in-band with Nippon. Her c01'l!llercial 
treaties with China were signed at the same t.1.me as ours. 
It would be d.1.tt1clut for America to keep herself from 
showing sympathy with our cause. We are told that the 
public sentiment of America is completely on the side of 
Htppon.10 
In a protest against the -yellow perll" threat an ed:i torial in the 
New York fimes upheld Japan by stating that talk about a ",.allow peril" is 
--
vain and ill-conoei ved unless there be a peril in treating 78llmr races ae 
fellow men, with humanity and justioe.ll The threat ot danger, aa anti-
Japanese SO'l.l:rCes argued, lay in permitting Japan to make her own peace. If 
she had her way in mald.ng peace, they feared she would aspire to rise againat 
the white 1"&C8, destroy caucasian prestige in China and India, and eventually 
overwhelm the white race.12 Bttll lnslst.i.ng that there was no "yellow p&1"1l1t I 
9 Edwin ~, "Wh;r We Favor Japan in the Present War", Arena 
Vol. XXXII (August 19(4), p .. 131 
10 Ib1d. 
-
n Wew York Times, July 26, 190$ 
........ ~ .F 
12 Ibid. 
-
r 
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the New York '.rimes stated that Japan gave not the slightest indication of 
--
undue pride, arrogance or antagonism against the Western world.13 
Edwin :Maxey in an article previously quoted. attempted to explain 
the underlying causes of American sjInlpathy for Japan. He ennumerated the 
cause for this sentiment toward J apanJ yet, he said it was inconsistent with 
our past friendship toward Russia.14 ~re was a natural sympathy to the 
weaker opponent; .America had given Japan her first look at Western civilisa-
tion and bad influenced that country to the extent that the Japanese bad 
become the "Yankee of the East.ttlS Also American trade in the Paeutc could 
not be overlooked, therefore, she must depend upon Japan.. Japan could not 
af'ford to abandon the ()pen door, thought Edwin JIaxey because by doing sO she 
would allienate herself b-om her best Mends - England and the United 
Statee.1.6 fhis writer, giving a. typical example of Japanese eenti.ment, 
continued sa;ving t'bat Russia stood for reaotion-the triumph ot absolutism 
OVer the rights of the incH. vidual, this was the anti thesis of pJ'epees tor 
which Japan stood.1? 'this is a sample ot but one ot maltf articles showing 
outward favor ot the Japanese cause .. 
11' t 1 .... 
13 Ibid. 
-
14 Maxey. p. 131 
15 Ibid. 
-
16 Ibid. 
-
11 Ibid. 
-
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Count eass1.ni tried to reSU1"rect American-Russian tri.endsh1p by 
recalling the visit ot the Russian fleet in American waters at the time of 
the OiVil War. He expressed surprise at our 1ngratitude.18 Wharton Baker, 
presidential nominee agreed with the above statement and pointed out further 
reasons for championing the Russian cause, as also did Colgate Baker in 
Ind!Eendenc~ .sasine.19 
A Russian publlcation accused the A.meri.cana of precipitating the 
war. !zeetn1k!!"?pz ot St. Petersburg said that the Japanese without the 
American press would never have involved themselves so deeply in the struggle 
with Russia and might have. sought an understanding rather than open oonfl1ot.20 
.!2!! V!"!\t! also of St. Petersburg said the tJn1 ted statea Id.med to make China 
an industrial center ruled by Americans in the torm ot trusts. 21 Port Arthur's 
!!!Z !!:2! said that Japan was not the real opponent, the un:t ted States had 
made Japan ita pawn in carrying out Roosevelt's plan that the Pacific Ocean 
w:l th all of 1. ts islands and coasts were the proper sphere of American 
domination. 22 
Russia, of course, objected to outward triend.ehip shown by America 
toward Japan. Part ot Russia t S obj action pointed to racial and religiOWlJ 
• ... ,* 
18 Dulles,!!!.!. ~12 Teheran, p. 89 
19 Wharton Bak~1 "The Secret ot Russia I s Friendship", Ind!pendence 
LVI (lfarch 17" 19(4), p. 049. Colgate Baker, "The Real Japanese aSracteiJi, 
Independence, LVI (March 17, 19(4) , p. 6b4. 
20 "Russian Opinion of American Meddling in the Far East", Review 
.!! ~eviewa, nIX (April 19(5), p. 166. 
21 Dulles, The ~!2 'teheran, p. 89-90 
22 Ibid. 
-
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differences. 'lbey protested that wt.d. te men should stand together against 
yellow and Christians against heathens.23 '!he following report from the !!! 
York Times and other similar reports added to the Amer1can people's distrust 
-
of Russia. The headlines read: ftJauntily Russia Gives Up Port Arthur." !be 
article pOinted out contrasts in character between the defeated Russians and 
the Japanese "rlctors.24 It said, "'the ,demeanor of the Japanese officers 'AS 
all that should be desired) they were politeness itself} and to see them' 
helping the Russians to sort their luggagel2S !he article continued saying 
that Russia recei Ted this assistance contemptuously. 'the onlookers had 
sympathy for the Russians until they beheld their costumes "tit for a ball 
rather than the finale of a tragedy," and until the soldiers pushed the 
wanen aside leaving them to await the next slow mO"fing train. 26 tt'l'he:r treat 
their women like so tIIoI.l'lY beaste.1f27 It can be readily imagined what affect 
this article had on the American housewife. 
Deepi te pleas tor American friendship, the feeling in the tJni ted 
States seemed to be that Russian autocracy was farther renoved .fl!o<a the spirit 
ot western Europe and the United States than were the Japanese.28 
23 Dean Howells, "The Peacemakers of Portsmouth", !!:!:per t s Wee!l:z, 
Vol. XLIX (August 20, 190;). p. 1244. 
24 !!! ~ Times, April 1, 1905. 
2; Ib1d. 
-26 Ibid. 
-27 Ibl<\_ 
28 'Arthur Judson Brown, !n! .. ~ .2!.!!!2!!!. East, (New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1919) I p. 192. 
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It was "nOt Russia.'s propaganda that turned America from Japan. It 
was Japan herself and Japanese victories which caused enthusiasm. toward Japan 
to wane. 29 Regarding waning favoritism toward Japan, an ed1toria1in the !!! 
York Times stated that Americans must still believe that Japan had the· better 
- . 
cause, but, it ea1d, when time for sentiment is past and consideration ot 
self-interest again possesses the m1nd~ one favors that 'Which will prove 
beneficial to hi_elf. Although Russia may have menaced our shippingS and 
Japan may keep the open door, the American shippers would not be able to 
compete with Japan' IS cheaper goods and she would undersell the Un! ted States 
and possess the markets.30 
As Japan began to show signs of victory - even while the newspaper 
battle previously mentioned with Russia was being waged - a shitt in opinion 
toward Russia became widespread. Americans were becoming suspicious of 
Japanese objectives.)! 
The Amer1can public _s warned against the tendency to idolize 
everything Japanese.32 Some ot the questions that arose in the public's 
mind were: would Japan olese the open doer? Would she respect American 
interests in Ohina it she were the ruling foroe in l.fanchu:ri.a? 
p Il ,. 
29 Paul S. Reinsch, p. $7 
30 !!!!2!:!1 t.t:iae,. April 1, 1905. 
31 Dulles, Road to 'teheran, p. 90 
32 Ibid .. 
-
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Mr.. 'Dul!!l.es expressed the feeling ot most Americans at the time not 
as ftbeginning to love Russia more" but the trend was to "love Japan less. ,,33 
A nEJltf cause for anti-Japanese sentiment arose during the peace negotiations, 
it was the outward attempt to .nay American opinion toward friendship to 
Russia. 'fhree influencing factors which contrtbuted to the switch in 
sentiment from Japan to Russia were: 1. the activities of Mr. Witte to ·sell" 
. 
Russia to the Alner1can public. 2. the threat to the United States t Pacific 
possessions. 3. the distrust of Japan created by the Japanese delegate. at 
the peace conference. 
Mr. Witte, the Russian representatives at the peace oonference 
obv:l.ously tried to ".ell· himself and the Russian cause. !he Japall$8e en'Voya, 
on the other hand, gave the public the impression ot being selt-asaured and 
arrogant. The!!! ~ _~ •. ,;;;.;;e_s eaid that JIr .. Witte "worked the newspapers 11ke 
an imperial press agent.·3h !be newspaper even implied that JIr. Witte went 
too tar in his atteq:>t to sway- the American public} "Control and more formal 
publici tytt J it said, "would bave been the better policy 41" " 
In contrast to the outward signs of the Russians to attain the good 
will of the American public I the Ob1cyo Mb1Jne36 quoted a Japanese source 
ItII n,.' r.t. jj 
33 Ibid. 
-
3h .!!!!2!:! 1'ime6, August S, 1905. 
35 Ib1.d. 
-
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stating their op1nion of public1t7 seeking. The article saidl 
We do not seek to obtain public sympathy b.Y such methods. 
American triendship, it it is sincere, a.s we believe it 
is, will not be overturned by the tact that Japan a.!'ter 
solemn compact entered into 1m" with Ruesta, refuses) in 
pursuance of allintern&tional precedent, to make public 
the negotiations now in progress. When sane a.r.rangElllJSl'lt 
shall bave been arriTed at, so tar trom losing Mendship 
in 1tb1s country, we believe the Japanese plenipoteDt:tar1es 
will growby' the stolid 1I'l\T ~ wbichwe tollbw' this oourse. 37 
The !!! ~ .... Time ............ s said that strict adherence was not paid to the 
poliey- of secrecy, and that it may be that they bave received peace which 
might not baTe been obtained if' their policy has been .fUl.tilled.38 
Man:r statements which manifest waning confidence in Japan expressed 
tear tbat Japanese nctories would breed a spirit ot "self-canciet which will 
lead her to think that she can conquer the 1IOrld. "39 
"mew while I do not gi va credenca to this", .sa1.d Ur. Roosevelt 
regarding the affect which Japanese victories might have on tbe Paci.tic,· ••• 
I must recognise that it bas some force. MhO 
Jf.r. Hull as chairman ot the House Committee of Jlil1tary Af'ta:tre 
declared that it Japan won the war with Russia, she would fight a bloody war 
with the United States aver the Phillpp1nes.41 Regarding this rising tear of 
41 Polittcal Science guarter;lz, Karch 16, 1905, quoted from the 
San Francisco GOiitcXe.··· 
36 
Japan, the Political Science ~ quoted the Ogden St.andard which said 
that the Ja.panese feel quite contident ot their ability to deteat the American 
navy and humilia.te our ar.my.b2 
In a letter to J. A. Hull, President Roosevelt wrote: 
It may be that the Japanese have designs on the Philippines .. 
I hope not ••• but I believe we should put our naval and 
mill tary preparations in sucP .. shape that we can hold the 
Philippines against aDiY toe.lt3 
Hr. Roosevelt aleo wrote, spealdng of the "formidable new power" .. 
Japan.. "It 1rr:1 'bated she could at once take both the Philippines and the 
Hawaiian Islands from us if she obtained the upper hand in the sea. ft44 Ma.uT 
.Amerlcans teared that Japan had 1 ts e,ree on the Philippines. 'lbe ed.1 tor 
Kohumin Shimbien stated that this change of attitude in the United States was 
due to the blWlder of a London printer who, in printing a war map.. made the 
Philippines the same color as that representing Japan.4$' Tokutom1 11chiro 
added, lilt Nippon were so wild and foolish as to take that nightmare in the 
southern seas (the Philippines) ott the bands of America, she might be 
pardoned to suppose that Nippon ought to l!"ebai ve a world or two of than.1cs from 
.... I j ... 
43 Ib1d. 
-
h4 Ibid. 
-
16 ftJapan on, the American Attitude", Review .!?! Reviewa, Vol. mx 
Ifay 1904, p. )19. 
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the American press. lt46 J1r. Blakeslee thouglrt that cause for the change in the 
publicls regard tor Japan was due to Russian diplom.acy.47 He wrote: 
The Russian diplomacy was particularly successf'ul in so 
pleading i is case to the American goverment, through its 
chief executive, and the American public, through the 
press J as to arouse the vague but none the less disquieting 
fear that Japan might one day occupy both Russia and the 
Chinese coast ot the Asiatic Pacific and next descend. upon 
the Philippines, Guam, Haw1~, and finally upon the Pacific 
slope of this continent.48 
the peace terms were another cause for the cooling attitude toward 
Japan. The public did not trust Japanese secrecy and suspected that Baron 
Kaneko was acting contrary to the Japanese claim of secrecy in negotiations. 
'the:r also distrouated his via1 ts With Mr • Roosevelt which were supposedly 
purely personal in nature. 
Japan bad received all that she had sought, if the war was actually 
fought to keep Russia out of Southern Manchuria and Korea. In addi Uon. 
Japan obtained Daln;y, Port Artb:ul", Ohinese Eastern Railroad, and. Southern 
Sagbalien which is rich in coal, iron ore, oil, fisheries, and is situated 
advantageously in a controlling position of the La Percuse Strait and the 
Japanese Sea. In contrast to Roosevelt's former spirit, he remarked to 
Senator Oabot Lodge in June of 1905J "Japan now has Port Arthur, Korea, and 
., t , r 
46 lb1d. 
-
47 o. H. Bl.akeelee. Jn~ !a! JaE!!!!$~ .Amer1~ Jtelatiol¥J., (Nert 
York: Stechert and Compe.lV'" 1 • 
48 Ibid., p. 230 
-
the domianee in tfanchuria. I f'eel that the less she asks f'ar in addition, 
the better it would be.49 Many shared. the Nation's opinion that the Ja.panese , 
claim for an indemnity was u.nwarranted.)o 
1'he printing of tour thousand N. ve hundred copies of' "Report on 
Japa.nese Naval Medical and Sa..'1itary Features of the Busso-.Ta.panese War" 
indicated somewhat of' a kingly att.1. tud~ toward the Japanese.51 Seereta.r.Y 
Root advised Ambassador Meyer to continue friendly offices in behalf' of the 
Japanese goverl'lllent and its subj eets. 
The fitty-ninth Congress praised. ltooaevel. t t S work but were con-
cerned more with results. ttlt halt that is told of Japanese intentions a.s to 
merchant marine 1s true, then an activity lVi11 issue on the Pa.cific Ocean 
which 1'1111 astonish the world. "S2 
In the tina1 analysis both of' the belligerents were seeking their 
own interests. The NSfI' York Times said that both combatants 'Were on tz:1al 
-_................. 
and that the actuating motive of Japan and Russia 'Vi'aS substantially 1denti ... 
cal.Sl !he article placed little con:f'1denee in the conference when it said 
that who ever was victorious, the United States would be the looser.S4 
liII 
49 Dennett, p. 16$ 
;0 Nation, Vol. LlXII (August 24, 19Q5), p. 153 
n 1'1.. PrestonL "Fa.ir Play for Japan" I ;tt1:vins ~ Vol. COLIX (October 17, 1908), p. 100. 
S2 "Exclusion of Japan from Vladivostockff , House Document No. ak 
(59th Congress 11th Seasion, 19(5), p. 29. -
53 !.!!!2!:! T1m~s, August 14, 1905. 
S4 Ibid. 
-
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In general, the nation favored the peace terms. The Midwestern 
~!!i!!eld R!publ1can considered the moral aspects of the terms) It saidl 
"Russia. has saved 1 ts kopecks and Japan bas lost,. but 1fhos$ is the moral 
prestige and advantage for the gain and 10asD ? It went on to say It ... 'Ion the 
tace ot things 1t 1s certain that Russia succeeded 1n presenting to Japan the 
moral victory and that this opportunity ot winning the moral victory bad been 
. 
seised in the possible view that it may be worth more than the material 
'Victory .. " Sentiment in the West was not so clear cut. A feeling ot distrust 
had become evident even at this time, but all were not in agretDent against 
Japan on the Pacitic ooast.,6 
Although the American public generall7 favored Japanta yielding and 
although the public was satisfied with the treaty, Japan never again regained 
its status in the sentiment ot the American public .. 
'l'bings had gone as they did because Japan had, by the terms or the 
Portsmouth Treaty, thrown ott the European balance of power. Therefore, 
Nippon became the center of the world's diplomatic activities.'1 
The Japanese felt that they had been victorious and thought that 
the7 were entitled to their peace demands especially allot Sagbalj.en and an 
'Ii , ,. 
SS W.. E. Gr.ttf'ia, "llhy Russia and Japan Should Shake Bands", 
Outlook, Vol txn (Augtl$t 1905) .. p. 963 • 
• r 
,6 Ibid. 
-S7 Count O'Kuma, "Diplomacy and the War," Ind!pendent, LII 
(August 2), 19Q5), p. U32. 
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indemnity to cover the cost ot war.58 Upon hearing the unofficial announce-
ment of peace, riots broke out in the Tokyo streets.59 These riots were a 
form of protest against the peace terms and against the United states, the 
scene of the peace negotiations. This situation probably developedbeeause 
the Japanese people were not in a pOSition to know the dangerous losses 
involved. in continuing the war. 60 The. violence in Tokyo and the discontent 
in st. Petersburg, were only that which might have been expected. 61 
•••• t1 dt 
S8 Arthur Judson BroIm, p.. 192. . 
S9 '1'heodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt, (Wew York, Charles 
Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 586. 
60 Ibid .. 
-
61 Ibid. 
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CHAP'tER IV 
RESULTS OF THE PORTSIDU'l'H CONFERENCE 
In this chapter an at~t will be made to state the ertecte ot the 
oonference upon the minds of the people of the United States and inoidentally" 
the ef:f'eets of the conference a.s shown by reactions in Russia and in Japan. 
In Chapter II, the terms of the conference were outlined. The conference had 
not been a :f'iasco sinoe the immediate aim was the cession of hostilities. 
Rev1n1ng the final day 01' the conference" we find Witte with a 
oabled ultimatum trom the Czar which read: "'I'o::tlOr1"OW must be the last 
oonterenee. I prefer war to humiliating concessions to Japan. h1 
lfr. Witte told the Japanese envoys what the cable had said and. 
added= "Russia will not pay indemnity in 3.rtr torm. We will agree to di vlde 
Sakhalin Island. That is the last word of my emperOl".,,2 
'1'0 this Baron Komura replied: ""!'hat proposal is not acceptable. 
!ut we will waive the indemnity and keep Sakhalin.ttl When Mr. Witte responded 
that Russia. wo-uld cede only one half of this island, the startling answer by 
1 Cbies-fa0 DailZ; Tribune, August 30, 1905. 
2 Ibid. 
-
:; Ibid. 
-
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Baron Kanurtu ""e agree", caused a great silence to fall over the conference 
room. 4 
The war bad ended, but. as is the case in most 1ALrS, the peace terms 
represented a major mental and diplomatic battJ.e. The results of the 
conf'erence were yet to be seen. Neither side had yielded and neither was 
wholeheartedly pleased with the outeomfll ot the events.. Rejoicing fol.lowing 
the negotiations as the Amerioan reaction. !his feeling was not shared by 
the parties concerned - c1 tizens ot Russia and Japan. '!'he Ohicago ~bune 
stated that -no one was satisfied except Roosevelt. u$ 
!he end of the war was a great boon to Europe. Europe welcomed the 
end of the war tor her own sake. Except in otf'ioial circles and in St. 
Petersburg and Berlin, the MWS that the peace will. be made win be received 
throughout Europe wit.h unbonded satisfaction and rejOicing.6 It ie 1d.t.h a 
sensation ot intense relief that France rejoioes. In Europe aDd America the 
success of the Portsmouth Conf'erenoe was the theme of conversation in clubs, 
cafes, and on the street. !he European countries were afraid lest the tension 
which bad reached a head in the torm of a Russo-Japanese War in the East, might 
spread tbrougbout Europe.. lfany countries had indirectly sided with either 
Japan or Russia. The Moroccan Crisis again bad become serious and the tact 
.... Ibtd. 
-
S Ibid. 
-
6 Ibid. 
-
that Russia now"ould be able to place a large force on her 1'fe8tern frontier 
ade the outlook for future developments brighter. 7 Word regarding the end 
of the war and also tu Offensive and Defensive AUiame between England and 
Japan removed the threat of the ltV spreading in the West. 8 
!he cause of Japan t s u.nexpeeted vd. thdrawal of her demand tor an 
indemnity was attributed to the pressure plaeed upon Japan by" Great Britian, 
. 
but that this was the iDmediate cause for tbe sudden end of peaoe negotia-
tions was denied. !he Chicago Tribune said that it was untrue also.' 
Although England earneet1y desired peace principally beoause or the European 
erial. in order to curb the (ai.Etr'S adventurous ap1r1t, Japan would not 
saeritice her own interests in this 1I'ay.1O 
Let \'II now turn to the reaction to the end of the conference in 
Russia. Otficiall:1, Russia _e.orry the war ended..U !here was not 80 
DlOh rejoicing in Russi,. as 111 America on the IlOI"nlng after the news ..... 
received in st. PetersbUrg. A report said that there was little difference 
on the streets of that cttl', fa nags fl_ and no one, except the newsb07s, 
, at 
7 Ibid. 
-
8 :Ibid. 
-
9 Ibid. 
-
10 lbid. 
-
n Ibid. 
bh 
WEtre anxious to 4I1sCUS8 the matter.12 A lussian soldier 18 quoted as voicing 
the opinion ot ~ when he 88.id that the war should have gone on alld Russia 
m1ght have done better. "!he strategic pos1 tion", he thought, ... more 
favorable than it had been the previous YelU".ftlJ 
'.f'he v1ctary 1n Japan stimulated a n .. IPirlt throughout Asia. Ft# 
the first time in tour hundred and fifty years an Asiatic parer had defeated 
. 
and turned back a European fwoe. lh This reaction came after much reflection, 
81me the immediate 1'eaction in Japan ftS marked vd th riots and mass meet-
inp .. l$ five chr:t.stiAn ohurcbea (tour of them Amer1oan) were damaged or 
destroyed by the rioters. Jfartial law and str.Lot press Ngulati<m8 had to be 
established which lasted until Icv'ember 29, 190>.16 m feeling in the form 
ot riota and protests were 11'1 tneesed mostly in the larger 01 ties of 1*olqo, 
lobe, and Yokohama.17 the 'fikado _s pet1t1oned to refuse to sign the treat,. 
aDd oontinue the war.18 !hare were also danands that the m1n:1etr'.r relign, 
t " 
12 O. ".'Wright, "Russia After the Warft , l'ation LmI (October 12, 
1905), p. 29S. 
13 Ibid. 
-1h P&18On J. Treat, The !!t East. a Political. and Diplomatic ~ (N .. Yorlct Harper's·~ l3U'1)l1ebIng a~,'"'DlB'J p. !6J. 
15 Pa1Bon J. !reat, Diplomatic Relatione Between the tm1ted States 
and 4!p!n, Ut2S-~. (Stanford, -eaU::rornIa, i!J'GiitOi'a ttiit verirtj Press, ' 
D~8), p. 2pr:-"' 
16 Ibid. J p. 249. 
-17 Ibid. 
-
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and offices of newspapers that had supported the govarmnent were wrecked 
reported Arthur J.. Brown.l9 Speoial precautions were taken to protect the 
American legation located between .. pOlice station and Marquis Ito t. 
residence.20 the newspapers were Ullan!moUS in declaring the terms 1lJ')oo 
satisfactory and lmmil~at1ng and the end of the 'war a "disgraceful surrender!J 
OOUl't circles 'Were intensely d18gusted with the peace terma.22 Mr. Griscom 
. 
in Japan 'WrOte to Mr. Roosevelt testitying the tact that the terms were iU-
received in Japan. Mr. Ol'iSOOJI wrote: 
.A large .ection of the press demanded and oonf'1dent1allT e»-
peeted the cession of t11att1vostok and the Russian sr1 tine 
provinces, as wen as the island of Sagbal1en, and the pay-
ment of a tbo1.18llld million dollars indemn11i7.. Even the more 
reasonable conservative clueea apected the ceo_slon of 
Bagbalien-- It mal" be ~ said that outside t.he 
~t, nobcKb" in the l!mpire espacted that Japan wcmld 
be obliged. to accept the te1'ms wb1ch it is now lIDderst004 
~ oontained in the treaty of peace.!) 
!he conference marked the beginning of a new at.titude ton.rd Japan 
in the Untted States. 'This attitude us partly due to a deliberate pollcy 
of Witte to Yin the good will of the American people. Rls aem.o1rs tell how 
he set about doing this and SIlOceed.ed.2h Witte said, " ••• the press in its 
19 Ibid. 
-
20 !reat, DiE- ~ti~ns Between tTnf.ted Stat~ !!!! Jaen, p. 248. 
21 N.d .. 
-22 Cld._1! P!!k Tribune. August 31, 1905. 
2, Treat, D1;elomatio Relations Between !!!! United States !!l4 
Jaee, p. 2b.B. 
24 treat,!!!!.!!£ !!ft. p. 38). 
turn _8 lnstrumeltal in bringing about a complete. change in publio opinion 
of the country in ,favor of IIU person and the cause I upheld.a2S !he end of 
the ttar also caused a marked change in the public on both sides of the Paci.f1c 
Japan thought Roosevelt responsible tor thetr 1088 of indemnity. fheAmer1can 
people SUSpected the foreign policy of Japan and were aroused over the 
Japanese 1nttgratlon problem.. Americans. were alarmed by military success and 
tv interJ3al changes within Japan 1Ibichabolisbed the Shogunate and built up 
military leaders inetead of ci'V'il1ane. This situation caused more and more 
cCIIIIIlent in the tIm. ted States 88 facts became k:nown. 26 At.f'1rst because of 
the great distance betwtlen Japan and the United Statea, the American people 
paid little attention to interDal Japanese af'f"a1r8 (11' l'llDlO'n et J'apaneae 
aggressive poliey. !his foreign policy had a slow growth but ita co.tant 
:reiteration 1n the Am.erican press could not tail to influence public opinion.!': 
When the treaty was aignedl sudden change in attitude toward Japan deYeloped 
and some papers OPenl7 doubted the ldsdcm. of hav:tng a atrong and independettt 
Japan in As!a .. 26 !hen arose fantastic tales of both nations. In Oanada the 
" ~ • n 
2S Ibid. 
-
26 PEq8011 J. f.teat, laE and the United States ~lnl, (Stanford, Oalifornia: stantOd ~versil7"PreS81 l~rn, p~'. 
27 Ib1d., p. 187. 
-
26 ~etation!! American Foreie: Po11&, Harris Foundation 
Lectures, p. • 
h7 
people "ere told"to ff!JllJr Japanese invasion of British Columbia.. Franee ..... 
alerted against possible attack on Indo-China, sites ot attack in South 
American, 'Mex1co, and the Pacific coast were pointed up.29 JIr. Pelicien 
Cballqe in .,Rewe ........... , S!. Paris was one of few who held that European1ut1on bad 
not changed the Japanese.30 lIa.ny writers shared Colgate Baker's opinion 
that the Japanese" .... (the,y) seEmed to ,accept western civilization but the7 
have accepted merely' its mechanism and not its ideas. They are playing a 
part, the better to carr:! out the s~ of their CMn nation.·.3l 
Arthur Jttcnm quoted other SOUl"Ces ot distrust of Japan printed after the war. 
One source said that either Japan or the UD1ted States must recede from its 
position. Japan's friendliness toward the United States, it Said, exists 
onLy in the meaningless conventional phrase or diplomatic usage in the 
propoganda of Japanese stateamen and American peace-a~ce advocates • .32 
Some reports R1'D.ed against Japanese troops in the Philippines 1'1'UIILbe.rinc 
55,000 when in reality there were Oliq 8,000 Japanese inhabitants there." 
American missionaries in Japan tried to patch up miS1.Ulde:rstandings 
by attemption to interpret Japanese actions. lIr. Brown suggested that 
I • I l 
29 Treat, JaE!!'!!!!! Urdted states Relat1.ons,p •. 188. 
)0 "Is Japan1s Progress Changing Japanese Cbaracter"? 
Work (JIay 19Oh), p. &726. 
-
)1 Ibid. 
-
,2 B.ttown, p.. h08. 
" Ibid., p. 401. 
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Americans ward drf possible difficulties b7 retu1ng to countenance some of 
the J'eports that ..... e eurrent.34 
Elilm ltoot, who succeeded Ha.7 as Secretar7 or state cODnented that 
during all that period there !leY" w.s a moment when the gove.mment of Japan 
was not frank, 81nc .. e and. t:riendl7, and most 8011ci tollS not to enlarge b\tt 
to Idnimiae and do -7 wi til all oa~ ot ccm.trov...,-.3S !here 1II'8're those 
1Who tftIJre still kindly disposed to Japan )"8t the sentiment was 80 great in the 
oppoa1te direction that senftl wartlings had been issued. in the foreign 
dispatches that the United States press should. suppress feelings and atreat a 
neutral.1ty which th.,- may' not have felt in order to keep 1 ts 1ntl'tl.f.m8e in tbe 
two countries.36 
The 1I'U' bad ended. the reason for its erJd 1I'a8 not obI'lous. .. .. 
1811ard advanced the idea that the war may have been br aJght to a close "be-
cause a_s:1a and Japan telt that the world was bec<md.128 un...,. about their 
continued occupation of lIanc!mr1a and they -f bave thought it wise to 
M terate allegiance to the open door and the terr1 tor1al 1n'tegri t7 of Oh1nJ. 7 
JIa%V' doubted whether Japan reallT expected to obtain 'What she 
I r I 1 •• 
.35 Ibid., p. hlo. 
-
.36 "Good l(anners taward Japan and Russia" I World'. !2r.!.ml 
(JIq 1904', p. 4725. 
37 !homaa Villard, Am.er1ca !!'!! the !!!: ?astern QBestion (lew York: 
JIoft'at Yard and OQ1llpan;y, 19(9), p" 280. 
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actually did.3S" A. Stead thought Japants action of yielding was a mark of 
shrewd statesmansh:lp .39 1Ib11e others thought the 'Wi tbdrawal ot cJ.a1ms ot 
1ndelmity not an act of statesmanship, but a necessity sinee contirm1ng the 
contlict .,uld bave made it appear that Japan launched the war tor money. 
Jlal'l7 felt that both had gained and both had lost and it was also generallJr 
bel1eved tbat ne1 ther had forced to ac~t humil1at1.ng terms. lfany atters 
were lett to be adjusted later,40 and there even existed the tear that war 
might break out apin between Russia and Japan even atter the peace.1tl 
1\1 Roosevelt's 8Ugpst1on to limeko that Japan 'Withdraw the in-
demnity issue, the United States waa involYed more in the actual peace 
maldng, since this item represented the most :tmporta:nt clauSe in the peace 
treaty and since this was the issue that almost caused a stalemate in the 
coDference proceedinp. Ja In an article ent1 tled "!be Menace ot Japanese 
Success., the author regretted the tact that this count1:'y had al.1gned itself 
with Japan rather tbanwith a._1& because, he thought by aiding nth Japan 
the United States could take the initSati'¥'e in the development of the 
38 !rcnm, p. 187. 
39 A. stead, "The Peace and After" I Rmewof Rev1_ DXII (Nonmber 19Q5), p. ~99. -
ho J6.lla.rd, p_ 280. 
bl I. H. HiaImond, ItKeDace of Japanese Success", World's Work X 
(June, 19Q5), p. 627. ' -
b2 E. J .. DUlon, "The ~ of Peace Negotiations" I Co~arz 
Review; LDl.'VIU (Octobel' 1905), p. 474. 
~~-----
so 
resources of 16ant:huria, !orea, and Ch1na.ls3 
Whatever the tuture outcome of the conference, the acclaim received 
by'Mr. Roosevelt fol.lowing the conference was tremendous. Ocmnentar1es on 
President Roosevelt.s participation in the negotiations reflect the teelings 
of the people regarding the settlement as well. President RooseTelt was 
compared 'to '1'1ber1us Gracchus because o! h18 eftort. to bring about peace by 
O. S. Dana in Review .2! Rm!!,!. 44 
lloosevelt like Q:racchus is a man of rare boldness and 
undoubted courage. Be 18 alao energetic, awesaive, 
persistent, and determined. Hia honest", 11ke that of 
f.tberius.. 18 the '.l"IlUed sort that J.cnmrs no taint of 
l!JUS.Picion iu1E! permits no caapraJdee with laggards and 
mldoera.16 
other comments saidt 
• 4 
!he American president f S auspicious act baa taken a 
high and ~nt place in the bistol7 of human .... 
deavor.40 
!he President J b7' bis wel.l.-meant efforts to establ1eh 
peace has merited well tor humanity and made a noble 
use of his e:mlted position and far-reaching influence. 
, .. he bas created a wholesome precedent which wen 
though 1 t cannot be fol.lowed by' and but exceptional.l.7 
~l~s of men, is none the less a welOG1D8 
11'11'Jt1Vation.41 
43 I. H., Hammond, Itltenace of Japanese Success," p. 6274. 
hh C. S. Dana, Review .2! l\eviews XIX! (llarch 1905), p. 3"5. 
16 ~. 
46 -The POl'tamouth Oonference," Outlook LUX (A:agust 17, 19(5). 
1&7 E. J. D1llon, "!be World's Peacemakers," C~or!!7l Review 
LlXXVln (SeptEmber 1~), p. )al. 
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$1 
And in ttte:rerz m.eet 
In spite 01 the risk that wa.s taken in involving the 
11Rl ted l'bates in an ,entaDg1.1ng all1ance f IIi8n7 American 
papers whoae pollc1.as are opposed to the p~,ident admit 
he took the proper COUl"Se on this oceasion.48 
!he Record Herud claimed; 
!he part played by the pres1dent in the negotiations baa 
been the occasion of editorials enough to till all of 
Ol.lt" pages. Without regard to party or sect1on. the papers 
praise him far his skill and tact in holding fihe conference 
.together until an agreement could be reached.", 
!here were but fa dissenting notes. If!:!'P!r t s "e!¥!lAidt 
!he president has the personal :renown of haVing 1.lrought 
about the conference, but too little is known ot the 
circumstances of bis intervention. He will be lauded 
by the multitudes for ha'Ving ass1.ted in 'brealdng the 
deadlock, but he entered upon th1s delicate task in a 
anner to impugn his part1ality and w1 th a scheme wtJich 
bad no cbance of acceptance. On this it is not neces-
sary to dwell 11011'. The rejoic1ng of the hour 18, that 
~ slaughter bas been averted, and that tile old 
world bas composed its ditf'erences in the new.50 
President Roosevelt besides congratulating the delegates theYJl8elvee 
sent his thanks to the laiser 1Ih1ch said: 
-
I thank 10U moet heartily tor your congratulations and 
wish to take this opportUDi ty to apr .. s 'Iff'3" profound 
appreciation of the way you cooperated at tWfIl!7 stage in 
48 tt!erms ot Peace," Uteraa R!leet m (September 9, 190», p. 33 
49' ttpeace as the Amer1can F4itors See It," Public 9R!ni.on xnII 
(September 9, 190$'), p. 337. 
~O E. J. Dillon, "Peaee COltterence at Portsmouth, If_ Hampshire, U 
!!!'Perts We!!9Z XLIX (August 26, 1~) I p. 1224. 
tho Irfon to bring about peace in the Orient. It hu 
been 'Very' pleasant to ~k with ;you tow'ard tlds end.,l 
Another COl!!!lent whioh hints of a euspicion of ltoosevel tt a moU ves in seeld.ng 
peace i8 a comment _de in a letter to the ed:i tor of Wation. 
ltoosevel t as peacemaker was not averse to war. Be inter-
t.ed because he teared that Japan would tu:rtbs.r humiliate 
Ru8sia and would become too pmrerful 1n1he East to e:u1 t 
the comtort and convenience of the :lmraders of the Orient 
from the West.52 . 
!he aarding of the Nobel Peace prize to Preaident Roosevelt is a 
mu.ch truer 1r.dex of the feeling of the general public toward the pt'e8ident 
fot! the part he plqed in the Portsmouth Conference. 
ftle Treaty ot Portsmouth bad baen signed and the W8:' ended" 
Japatlts only temporary set baek 'b7 the outcome soon began to re-establish 
herself in her new role of dominance of the Pacific. Russia, strangled 
by 1nteI"nal. aff'a.1re was rele1'Ved by the cecession of hostilities and con-
centrated on mending hap internal affairs. 
The United. Stat_ having gained a higher statue in the world's 
qeI by her role as mediator between two war1ng countries now had two parte 
to pl..q-one of maintaining he%" position in t.b.e Pacific and quieting anti-
Japanese sentiment particularly on the western coast of this courrt,ry. 
'this ;rear marks the fort,..siXth anm:versa:ry of the Signing of the 
Portsmouth Treaty. !he newspapers ahow a reversion in public optnion-
.. 
n !!! York 4fr1bme, Septatber 1, 190$. 
,2 'Batton, Septanber 14, 1905. 
'Which incidentaUy has ohanged many times in the tmSUr1ng years * 'the 
Chicso Da11,l!!!!, recalls that the anniversary of the Portsmouth Oonference 
oocun on the eve of the signing of the peace treaty off1ciallT raa:r1d.ng the 
end of the wr between the tTmted states and Japan.S3 One 1s tempted to 
uk whether there 1s any relation between the two events. I'1ght the second 
peace treaty have been avoided by' a more eftectiYe Portsmouth Treaty? '1'0 
az:t.n'fir thts question \1Ould necessitate ones assuming the role or an arm-cba1r 
strategist. Yet it can be seen that in the reporting of the conf'erence 
t01"'bT rears aftern..~ j the writer treated the subj ect in llght of present 
dq pllbllc opinion. !bus "playing up" the fact that Russia _8 thedeteated 
nation and Japan was the v.Letorioue diplomat because of the fact that public 
fa:vori ttan has once more sMlted toward Japan and awq from Iuseia. 
So tar j the cbanges in public opinion have been discussed because 
the policies ot state are today large~ d1rected by what people believe. 
fheir opin1on may be based upon error and m1e1ntonation, but if they believe 
them sincerely j they act upon them. !his 1s eepecial.l.7 true of a dEmocracy 7h 
It is not enougb to oonsider the official relations between states. 
It 1s imperati ve~ necessary to understand 1Ihat people are tb1nld ng about 
their ne1gbbor.SS 
, .. 
S3 ChleaE pailz News, Septsber 5, 19$1. 
~ Treat, JaE!!:!!!! United s"tate~ ~tlons, p. 1911.. 
$ Ibid. 
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CONCLUSION 
'the Japanese had entered into open conflict with Russia for a 
cause which in the minds of the general public was just. Russia was con-
sidered to be the aggressor ascending trom the North on its compal"ati "ely 
tiny neighbor who, because of her smaller size, was thought to be the weaker 
country. Because Japan had never Erltered into open conflict with a world 
povieP, the world thought Japan would soon be overpowered. !he tact that 
Japan was able to make cOl'lSide:rable advances against Russia 1'1&1 soon ap-
parent to the rest of the world. fhe war was bloody and costly and the 
finances of both countries suffered to the extent that both were willing to 
negotiate peaoe. 'l'his peace conference was made possible by the imitation 
for their representatives to meet in the l1n1ted states. 
At this timet the people ot the United states felt that Japan had 
fought tor a just cause and. were more k1ndl.y disposed to Japan. than to 
Russia. !he opinion _s that Japan had undertaken a 1IQ' be70nd ber own 
strength. fh1e caused a teeling of a,mpathy to develop in favor of Japan.1 
The L1 tEtra" D1sest $U!"'O"eY' said that at the outset ot the war I no paper 
favored any other po1i.e,- than one of neutrali t7, but an overwhelming number 
, r. 
)) 
openly expressed' their tull sympathy for Japan.2 '!'he preas generally bailed 
every Japanese vietora' and did not disguise its hope that Russia would be 
quickl7 and decisively'defeated.' 'liae had come 'When the American people 
"were constrained to say to Ruesia that they could no longer ~t h .... tth 
!he Americans bad lost tn th in Russia until the enettgetic Sergius 
Witte set about Winning over the Unitet;\ states press tD the Russian cause.; 
His efforts along with ._. adverse cr1tLci_ of the Japaneee delegates were 
so successful as to win for btm and the Russian cause the friendship ot 
IIIlU'l7 .bI.er1cans.. Therefore, as the peace negotiations ....... in pt"Ogt"eS8, 
American public opinion had diverted fran the Japanese cause to that of 
Russia. 
Japan t s holding out tor an 1ndeBrm. ty to cover the coat of Dr 
caused unpopular1 V.. and e'Ven the delayed w1 tbdraal of their demand for an 
indemnity .. which 1f&S considered a diplomatic viotory b.1 some mters, did 
nothirJg to w.Ln back A1Ier1can friendship toward Japan. Some sections of the 
Japanese populati.on l"eUted to the peace negotiations in riotious protests 
agaiDBt America - the scene of the negot.iations. !be ov~ of the 
Shogmate and the increased mill tarization of the Japanese nation was an 
I ft •. t 
2 Poater Rhea Dull~1 The Road to !eh ... n, (Princeton, Hew Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 19l.14);-p'."1m:8T.' ' 
, Ibid. 
-
h Ibid .. 
-
anti-climax to t\e feeling al1'eady held in the hearts of the American 
people.6 Skeptici8ll1 and suspicion at the Japanese victories, amb1 tions and 
rurtber aims bad already spread throughout the oountry to the extent that 
Japan was not trusted by the American public. A. 1IX'i tar in the rortn:tgh~ 
Rm_ affirmed th1s statement when it said that the Japanese undoubtedly #. rz 
suffered from revulsion of public opin1:0n through their mill tary capabili-
ties.? Japan's 'Y1ctories became .. drawback to her because the nations of 
the 1I'01"1d began to look askance at her wondering where her strength m:1.ght 
lead her. 8 !.bere was a decided tmdency for the world to transfer their 
fear of :R.u$Bia to Japan. 
When the Japane_ demand tor payment of an indemnity threatened 
to cause a stalemate in the Portsmouth Conference. Russ1a DS urged to yield. 
The Obi cae Mbune said that John D. Rookef'eU .. bad been asked to give 
Russia the money to pay the indemn1.ty and end the aJ'.9 !his paper also 
said that President Roosevelt wrote Witte asld.ng bim to yield a fn da1$ 
after meeting with Jlr. laneko, a Japanese statesman, whom he bad asked to 
withdraw the dema.nd.lO 
I r 
6 Pa7$on J" !Nat, JaE and the tTrd. ted states ~8S)-.lSl, (Standord, California: stantml wralti1'iess, lHe); p7'"1Jj. 
? A .. Stead. p. 6S2-6S3. 
8 Ibid., p. 654. 
9 Chi_Io tribune" August ZS, 19C5. 
10 Ibid., August 22, 1905. 
-
S1 
Desp1te1tU8sia'e persistence in retutdng to grant Japan an 
indem:ni tJr tor the cost of war, any thought the d1plomatic victory belonged 
to Japan. !be ~h1oaE 'fr1.bune ~8$sed this idea when it said speaking ot 
Japan, 
••• abDrd.ng tv reaching statesmanship of lttghest Ol'der and 
w:t:th a magranimity that bas no paraUel1n history, nctori-
ous JapIUl through her plen1potenta.r1es agreed this mormng 
to make peace with Rusi •• ll . 
!b& Japanese goyermaent did yield by wi tb.d:tning their demand. but 
1Iri 'hers did not agree as to who bad achieved. the mil1 tary vict0J7 nor the 
diplelaatic victory. JIoat wr1 teN agree that both won cert&1n aspecta an4 
both lost in other respects. N&'V'erthe1ess, the fighting ceased oaueing re-
percussions in both countries. 
The Russian reaction _s $1llI'JI'BIr1zed in tbe London t.am.ee which 
said that perhaps never in Russian history bad the newspapers so bol.cJl.y and 
clearl¥ ca:pressed the plain truth or the situation. Still quoting a Russian 
newspaper it said: 
Can 1I'e ever forgive this regime which brought Russia so 
low that she should bave to rejoice because she was not 
compelled to pay an indemz:d ty and which sinoe August 19, 
has began to recede into the past. Kuasia vr.1.11 never 
forget this sbameless 'lII'ar.12 
Oonditions in Japan are summa.rized in the following statements, 
the tirst by Oount Okuma. 
Oondi tiona berore the war are liable to repetition 
instead of removing any causes ot future disputes 'f;he 
.. or ill .......... 
n Oh:1cago tribune, August 30) 1905 
12 f1mes (London) I September 7, 190" quoting !rom St. Petersburg. 
... 
the .nt1~ lett the oorJd1t1<ma exactly •• tb87 .... 
before hosUlit1e8 bepn.U 
.And trc:a the LoDdoa ftIIeal r . .. 
....... 10_ MC\t<m8, ~al oreana, pointed out 
tat the o'bjeot.tone to the war baVe been ~ attained, 
at 1t 1t 1s to oont1nue to tight wUl ~ Japan to 
...."oach of 8&Ori.tio1ng tbe 11.,. of people ei~ tor 
......,or ..... 1" ~t ...... the world'. desire 
t .. peaoe and tbe dicta_ 01" br.manityaN nmf _tist1ed.lL 
!hen .. a ~ feeling of o~ tJ'l'rouIh J ... 1$ 
l'IritGn staw that tboee IlI08t ~ in the wtoome ~ the 
~ ~. wMolt ~ 'bce1;illt.1. to ~_e til ~ tbat the:tr 
8ecwtty be qnredJ and the tJm.ted states .'t4ob rejo1oed OYer tbe d1plollat1o 
'ViO""" em tbe pa;rt at their ~det and tbs det1n.tw eet&blt .... nt of tbe 
t1tt\t.ed statee .. s & world ~. 
In the Id.ue ,.... ~ ,btl ~~ War and the Wor14 WU', 
while doubt eJieted in the mi. of the people, ~tions 11~ tri~ and 
C01"""". A goo4 und~ng and tbe t:-ad1tloral tY1endfiiJ:d.p ~. 
!he time wUl. come, 1Ir.rOte P43'IfOll J" ~t, wben puWo optrd.cm w1U 
make and __ mtrrlaWN.16 
II ••• - ,tT .... _ 'F '.1 
13 l\!II (kmdoa), S~ 8, lfOS. 
lh 1ttJ4. 
15 llf4. 
16 ~ It fleat • .,. ~ M\:.~B''''~n..lSl (staJd'.-d, Ca1ltOl'JdAU stanfOfid . :v'Eiirt.7 ....), p. DIr.'" 
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